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Abstract
This paper characterizes equilibrium asset prices under adaptive, rational and Bayesian learning
schemes in a model where dividends evolve on a binomial lattice. The properties of equilibrium stock
a n db o n dp r i c e su n d e rl e a r n i n ga r es h o w nt od i ﬀer signiﬁcantly compared with prices under full infor-
mation rational expectations. Learning causes the discount factor and risk-neutral probability measure
to become path-dependent and introduces serial correlation and volatility clustering in stock returns.
We also derive conditions under which the expected value and volatility of stock prices will be higher
under learning than under full information. Finally, we derive restrictions on prior beliefs under which
Bayesian and rational learning lead to identical prices and show how the results can be generalized to
more complex settings where dividends follow either multi-state i.i.d. distributions or multi-state Markov
chains.
1. Introduction
Recent studies have recognized the importance of explicitly incorporating learning eﬀects in equilibrium
asset pricing models.1 Learning introduces a link between state variables and agents’ beliefs which the
standard assumption of full information rational expectations ignores. This link creates rich dynamics
in the mapping from state variables to agents’ decisions and thus aﬀects market outcomes such as prices
and returns. However, although many alternative learning schemes have appeared in the literature (e.g.,
adaptive boundedly rational, Bayesian or rational), little is known about their properties when applied to
equilibrium asset pricing problems. In fact, the majority of the literature on asset pricing under learning
has been developed in a partial equilibrium setting while general equilibrium eﬀects have not received
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and seminar participants at the European meetings of the Econometric Society in Lausanne (August 2001), IGIER Milan,
Universit´ ed eM o n t r ´ eal, Stanford University, and University of York.
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1B r e n n a na n dX i a( 2 0 0 1 ) ,B u l l a r da n dD u ﬀy (2001), Timmermann (1993, 1996, 2001), and Veronesi (1999) are among the
contributions on the topic.nearly as much attention.2
In this paper we show that equilibrium stock and bond prices strongly depend on the nature of the
underlying learning process. Our analysis proceeds in the context of one of the cornerstones of modern
ﬁnance, namely the binomial lattice model proposed by Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979). This model is
the discrete time equivalent of the geometric Brownian motion process underlying the Black-Scholes model
and has thus been used extensively in ﬁnance (see, e.g., Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1984)). While in
the classical ﬁnance literature asset prices are assumed to follow a binomial lattice, we assume instead that
dividends follow a binomial lattice with unknown probability of an up move, π. In equilibrium, asset prices
are determined endogenously as a function of the evolution in agents’ beliefs and in dividends.
Existing studies can usefully be separated according to whether they use boundedly rational (adaptive)
or fully rational learning schemes and whether agents use Bayesian or non-Bayesian approaches. Along these
lines we compare three learning models, namely Bayesian, rational and adaptive schemes. Bayesian agents
view π as a random variable and start with a set of prior beliefs on the probability distribution of π that are
updated through Bayes’ rule as new dividend information arrives. Under the two other learning schemes,
π is viewed as non-random. The adaptive learning model ignores changes in future parameter estimates,
ˆ πt+k, viewed from the present (time t), conditioning instead on the current estimate, ˆ πt.3 In contrast, the
forward-looking, ‘rational’ learning scheme accounts for future updates in ˆ πt, acknowledging that although
π is constant, the estimator, ˆ πt+k, is a random variable that is correlated with future dividends. Under
rational learning, asset prices reﬂect not only the most recent estimate of the parameters, but also all
possible future values that the estimator may take. Current equilibrium prices thus reﬂect all possible
future probability distributions of the parameter estimates.4
Unfortunately, the need to consider all possible sequences of (path-dependent) predictive distributions
normally makes rational learning models diﬃcult to handle. At best, multi-step predictive densities can be
approximated numerically. The binomial setup provides an ideal vehicle for addressing these concerns. It
generates closed-form expressions for the predictive distribution of future payoﬀs that allow us to provide
analytical results on the properties of asset prices under learning. Furthermore, the results are easy to
interpret. Agents update their parameter estimates each period noting which state occurred, and intuition
in terms of ‘good’ news (the up-state) and ‘bad’ news (the down-state) applies.
We ﬁnd that the properties of equilibrium prices on learning paths diﬀer strikingly from the full informa-
2For instance, Lakner (1995) investigates consumption and portfolio choice in a ﬁnite horizon model in which agents have
power utility. While asset prices are observable, their drift and the price shocks are not. As a special case, Lakner studies
t h ec a s ew h e r ea g e n t sl e a r nb yr e c u r s i v ea p plication of Bayes’ rule and derives the optimal portfolio policy using martingale
methods.
3Most of the early literature on asset pricing implication of learning adopted the adaptive, least-squares learning approach,
see e.g. Timmermann (1993), Barsky and De Long (1993), and Barucci (2000). Sargent (1993) contains a number of ap-
plications of boundedly rational learning schemes to ﬁnance. Evans and Honkapohja (1995), Kuan and White (1994), and
Marcet and Sargent (1989) proved convergence for parametric least-squares estimators while Chen and White (1998) considered
nonparametric estimators that approximate unknown equilibrium relationships with ﬂexible functions.
4Uncertainty about the future mappings from state variables to decisions is thus explicitly incorporated in agents’ expected
utility maximization problem. Boundedly rational learning rules do not incorporate the eﬀects of future learning on current
asset prices and give agents incentives to engage in trading to exploit future learning eﬀects (Townsend (1978, pp. 485-486)).
2tion rational expectations case. For instance, under learning, perceived dividends follow a non-stationary
distribution and the mapping from realized dividends to equilibrium stock prices also becomes time-varying,
even though the true (but unknown) dividend process follows a stationary, homogenous Markov chain. This
means that the risk-neutral probability distribution becomes path dependent. We also show that agents’
probability beliefs under rational learning form a mean-preserving spread relative to the adaptive learning
scheme that ignores the eﬀect of future updating in beliefs. More speciﬁcally, the limiting distribution of
asset payoﬀs under rational learning is no longer log-normal but follows a beta-binomial distribution whose
parameters reﬂect agents’ current beliefs.
We establish precise links between equilibrium asset prices under the three learning schemes. We show
that asset prices under the rational and Bayesian learning schemes are identical provided the Bayesian
agents have beta priors. Under diﬀerent priors, the Bayesian learning equilibrium may not be fully rational,
so rationality eﬀectively imposes constraints on the structure of the priors which must reﬂect the underlying
model as they do in the beta-binomial case. Likewise, asset prices under adaptive learning arise as a special
case of Bayesian learning when agents have degenerate priors that put full weight on the current probability
estimate.
Some papers have considered the equilibrium eﬀects of recursive ﬁltering of hidden state variables.
Brennan and Xia (2001) and Veronesi (1999, 2004) develop continuous time models where the dividend
drift is unobservable and a ﬁltered estimate is used by a representative agent. In Brennan and Xia’s model
there are two lognormally distributed state variables, dividends and non-capital income. Veronesi’s papers
focus on the dividends process but assume that the drift may switch between two values. Timmermann
(1993, 1996) studies the equilibrium eﬀect of adaptive least squares learning on asset prices when agents are
risk neutral. Lewellen and Shanken (2002) propose a simple overlapping generations model for a risk-averse,
Bayesian agent who is learning about the unknown mean of dividends. These papers show that parameter
uncertainty can lead to predictability and excess volatility in equity returns. However, this literature has
not considered the same array of learning schemes that we entertain here so uncertainty remains as to the
characterization and ranking of the eﬀects produced by diﬀerent assumptions on how investors learn.
A related literature investigates the properties of Bayesian learning schemes under experimentation.
In the context of Bayesian learning, Wieland (2000a, 2000b) ﬁnds important diﬀerences between myopic
(adaptive) learning schemes−which minimize (maximize) a Bayesian loss (reward) function conditional on
the most recent estimate of the posterior density of some unknown parameters−and fully optimal (rational)
schemes where expectations are taken with respect to future beliefs that change over time. Consistent with
these papers, we ﬁnd that rational learning schemes lead to very diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes (asset
prices) relative to myopic-adaptive schemes. Moreover, we also ﬁnd that Bayesian learning in itself is
neither necessary nor suﬃcient for full rationality of decisions on a learning path.5
Brandt, Zeng, and Zhang (2004) perform an exercise related to ours that − using numerical methods
applied to a version of the Lucas (1978) asset pricing model − compares the properties of equity risk premia
5Wieland also makes it clear that while adaptive policies can easily be characterized in closed-form, rational ones normally re-
quire numerical methods. In this paper, we manage to characterize closed form solutions for asset prices by assuming−consistent
with a number of papers in ﬁnance−that dividends follow a binomial lattice.
3under Bayesian learning and under various suboptimal learning rules (e.g. over- and under-conﬁdence, c.f.
Abel (2002)). While Bayesian learning does aﬀect risk premia, the suboptimal rules are associated with
stronger eﬀects. While the objective of comparing the eﬀects of alternative learning rules on equilibrium
stock prices is common to this and our paper, there are clearly many important diﬀerences. First, by
focusing on the binomial lattice we can derive many analytical results that do not require simulations or
approximations. Second, we study learning in the form of parameter estimation uncertainty while Brandt
et al. (2004) investigate a ﬁltering problem for a Markov switching model. Finally, while Brandt et al.
(2004) compare Bayesian learning to rules from the behavioral ﬁnance literature, we limit ourselves to
learning schemes that are not commonly construed as the outcome of behavioral biases.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The binomial lattice model is introduced in Section 2. Section
3 derives equilibrium asset prices under full information rational expectations. Section 4 introduces the
three learning schemes. Section 5 characterizes equilibrium asset prices on the learning paths and provides
conditions for the existence of an equilibrium. Section 6 provides insights into the eﬀect of rational learning
on the distribution of asset payoﬀs and uses simulations to quantify the eﬀects of alternative learning
schemes on equilibrium asset returns. Section 7 shows that many of our results and insights can be
generalized to more general stochastic processes, although the basic intuition is better conveyed by the
binomial lattice case. Section 8 concludes and an appendix contains proofs of the main results.
2. The Binomial Lattice Model
Consider an economy with two assets: a single-period, risk-free, zero-coupon bond in zero net supply
trading at time t at a price of Bt and earning interest of ft = −lnBt. After one period, the bond pays out
a single unit of the consumption good. There is also a stock in unit supply trading at a price, St.T h es t o c k
pays out an inﬁnite stream of dividends {Dt+k}
∞
k=0 measured in units of the consumption good. Dividends
evolve on a binomial lattice with dividend growth rates gt+k ≡
Dt+k
Dt+k−1 − 1 driven by a Bernoulli process:
gt+k =
(
gh with prob. π
gl with prob. 1 − π
π ∈ (0,1) (1)
We assume that gh >g l > −1 so dividends are always positive provided D0 > 0,D t ∈ R++.6
Limiting our attention to an arbitrarily large, but ﬁnite, number of periods T, the information set






I{·} is a standard zero-one indicator function. Each ωT ∈ ΩT captures a possible sequence of dividend
growth rates up to time T. The information available to the representative agent at each point in time
includes only knowledge of present and past dividend levels. Hence, the economy’s information structure
FT = {zt;t =0 ,1,...,T} is a ﬁltration composed of an inﬁnite, nested sequence of σ−algebras, zt+1 ⊇ zt
6<+ is the set of non-negative real numbers; <++ the set of positive real numbers.
4∀t ≥ 0, with zt representing the ﬁrst t movements of dividends. For given D0 this ensures that the process
{Dt}
T
t=1 is adapted to FT. Finally the probability measure is given by
P(ωT)=πj(1 − π)T−j, (2)
where ωT ∈ ΩT is any state with j high growth and T − j low growth occurrences.
2.1. The investor’s optimization problem
For a given dividend process, we follow Lucas (1978) and let asset prices be determined in equilibrium by
the representative investor’s ﬁrst order conditions. There is a single representative agent who is a price
taker and has an inﬁnite horizon. The consumption good, paid out in the form of dividends, is perishable.
Ownership of assets is determined by trading in competitive markets for exchange of the consumption
good, stocks and bonds. In equilibrium the representative consumer holds the existing (unit) supply of the
stock and consumes all of the dividends paid out by the stock (c.f. Lucas (1978, p. 1430)).








where u(·): <+ → < is a continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave Von-Neumann
Morgenstern utility function, and Ct is real consumption at time t. β = 1
1+ρ, 1 >ρ>0 is the subjective
rate of impatience, and E [·|zt] ≡ Et[·] denotes the conditional expectation operator. We assume that the
functional (3) is bounded (although u(·) may be unbounded) but later derive conditions under which this
holds. No assumptions are made on the mapping between the probability distribution used to calculate
E [·|zt] and the information set zt. In particular, this mapping is allowed to change over time as a function
of past state variables.
Following common practice in the literature, much of our analysis assumes that the representative






1−γ γ 6=1 ,γ≥ 0
lnCt γ =1
. (4)
This function is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave as assumed.
The agent’s holdings of stocks and bonds in period t, ws
t and wb
t, solve the following problem: Given a
pricing function mapping dividends into asset prices, the state of the economy, Dt, and initial asset holdings
ws
t−1 and wb






k=0 , to maximize the discounted value of the inﬁnite stream of expected future utilities






Ct+k ≥ 0 ∀k ≥ 0. (5)
5Here {St+k,B t+k}∞
k=0 are asset prices consistent with the assumed pricing function. In equilibrium the
consumer holds exactly one unit of the stock and no zero-coupon bonds. Without loss of generality we
can thus introduce a bound ¯ w>1 on the asset holdings, |ws
t+k| ≤ ¯ w and |wb
t+k| ≤ ¯ w (∀k ≥ 0); so that (5)
deﬁnes a compact set. None of these bounds will be binding in equilibrium. Our goal is to characterize
asset prices in a particular class of equilibria (Prescott and Mehra (1980)):
Deﬁnition 1 (Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium). A stationary competitive equilibrium
is deﬁned by:
(i) A stationary pricing function q: <++ → <2
+ − q(Dt) ≡ [St(Dt) Bt(Dt)]0− from the current state of
the economy, Dt, to asset prices.
(ii) A continuous value function V : <++ ×< 2 → <,V(Dt,ws
t−1,wb
t−1).








subject to the constraints (5). This maps the state variables relevant to the agent into optimizing
consumption and portfolio decisions, ˆ wC(Dt) ≡ [ ˆ Ct ˆ ws
t ˆ wb
t]0. ˆ wC(Dt) takes the pricing function q(Dt)
as given.
(iv) ˆ Ct = Dt, ˆ ws
t =1and ˆ wb
t =0 , i.e. markets clear.
Given any continuous, strictly positive pricing function q: <++ → <2
++, Prescott and Mehra (1980) show
the existence of a unique, bounded, measurable, and continuous function V (Dt,ws
t−1,wb
t−1) under our
continuity and boundedness assumptions on u(.) provided that the conditional c.d.f. of Dt is continuous,
and the feasible set of consumption and investment choices is compact and continuous in the state variables.
This value function satisﬁes the Bellman optimality equation
V (Dt,ws
t−1,wb
















Ct ≥ 0 ws
t ≤ ¯ ww b
t ≤ ¯ w (6)
V (.) generally depends on the assumed pricing function q. Moreover, when u(·) is concave and the budget
constraint convex, V (Dt,ws
t−1,wb
t−1) may also be shown to be strictly increasing and (weakly) concave.
Using continuity and concavity of the value function, existence of a recursive competitive equilibrium
follows from standard contraction mapping arguments.7
7It is easy to show that boundedness of the value function follows directly by imposing the condition ρ>π g h +( 1− π)gl.
63. Asset Prices under Full Information
To derive the properties of the stationary pricing function q, we use property (iii) of the deﬁnition of a
competitive equilibrium. Under full information rational expectations, the investor’s optimization program
implies the ﬁrst-order conditions
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tSt − ˆ wb
tBt)+ βE
£











¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
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= u0( ˆ Ct). (7)
Substituting (7) into the ﬁrst order conditions, we obtain stock and bond prices
St = E [Qt+1(St+1 + Dt+1) | zt], (8)
Bt = E [Qt+1 | zt]. (9)
Qt+1 = βu0( ˆ Ct+1)/u0( ˆ Ct) is the representative agent’s marginal rate of substitution between consumption
in period (t+1)andperiodt. Every pricing function (8)-(9) reﬂects the representative agent’s preferences







or, from the equilibrium
condition, Ct+k = Dt+k,Q t+1 = β (1 + gt+1)
−γ . (8)-(9) and Qt+1 = β (1 + gt+1)
−γ thus constitute the
stationary equilibrium pricing function in Deﬁnition 1. Lucas (1978, p. 1435) shows that these pricing
functions are unique (from uniqueness of the stationary recursive equilibrium).
In the full information case where the parameters of the dividend process {π,gh,g l} are known to
agents, an explicit solution for asset prices is obtained using the method of undetermined coeﬃcients:
SFI












Dt ≡ ΨFI(π)Dt. (10)
The linear homogenous form of the equilibrium pricing function SFI(zt,π)=ΨFI(π)Dt is a direct implica-
tion of expected utility maximization.8 ΨFI denotes the constant pricing kernel. The solution to (10) can
conveniently be stated in terms of the transformed parameters g∗
l =( 1+gl)1−γ−1a n dg∗
h =( 1+gh)1−γ−1:
Proposition 1. Suppose that ρ>π g ∗
h+(1−π)g∗
l and that the transversality condition limT→∞ Et[(
QT
k=1
Qt+k)St+T]=0holds. Then the full information rational expectations (FI) stock price, SFI












8Mehra and Prescott (1985, p.152) note that linear homogeneity of the pricing function in dividends is a general property
of constant relative risk aversion preferences.
7The full information bond price, BFI
t ,i s
BFI =
(1 + gl)−γ + π[(1 + gh)−γ − (1 + gl)−γ]
1+ρ
> 0. (12)
The proof is given in Appendix A. Since the stock price is homogeneous of degree one in dividends, SFI
t
follows the same binomial lattice {gh,g l,π} as dividends.9
Notice that while Cox et al. (1979) take the process for the underlying price as exogenous, we derive
the underlying stock price in an equilibrium model. This result can also be related to Stapleton and
Subrahmanyam (1984) who value options in a general equilibrium model where markets are incomplete
and the stock price evolves on a lattice. In contrast to Stapleton and Subrahmanyam, our model assumes
that markets are complete, but −as in their paper−the exogenous lattice process applies to dividends.
Obviously, in both cases preferences aﬀect the equilibrium stock price. Moreover, while in Cox et al.
(1979, p. 232) stock prices follow an exogenous binomial lattice process so that the restriction gl <f<g h
is necessary and suﬃcient to rule out the existence of arbitrage opportunities, no such restrictions are
required here. The condition
ρ>π g ∗
h +( 1− π)g∗
l (13)





Qt+i) Dt+s] and therefore existence of the equilibrium.
4. Learning Models
Suppose now that agents do not know the true value of the parameter π and instead use the available
s a m p l ei n f o r m a t i o no nc u r r e n ta n dp a s td i v i d e n d szt to estimate π ∈ Π ≡ [0,1]. Since the seminal papers
by Blume et al. (1982) and Bray and Kreps (1987) boundedly rational and fully rational learning schemes
have been considered in the literature. In boundedly rational or adaptive learning models agents treat their
time-t perception ˆ πt of the unknown π as if it were the true parameter value. ˆ πt is recursively updated
over time, as new information arrives. Changes in the perceptions ˆ πt induce non-stationarities in the
equilibrium relationship, but such (ex-post) time-variation is ignored in agents’ decisions.10 In contrast, a
rational learning scheme assumes that agents account for the eﬀect of learning on the equilibrium mapping
between payoﬀ-relevant state variables and prices (c.f. Townsend (1978)). Since recursive updating induces
changes in ˆ πt+k (k ≥ 0), future estimates of π are treated as random variables. Rational learning requires
consistent updating of beliefs on π and therefore that Bayes rule be recursively applied.
Under Bayesian learning, agents view π as a random variable. A Bayesian learning scheme is neither
necessary nor suﬃcient for rational learning.11 Our paper shows that an explicit Bayesian set-up is not
9As in Abel (1988), when γ<1, prices will increase as a function of the proportion of high growth states (π), while the
opposite result holds for γ>1. Under logarithmic utility (γ =1 )t h ea s s e tp r i c ei si n d e p e n d e n to fπ.
10Examples include Bray (1982), Bray and Savin (1986), and Marcet and Sargent (1989).
11Indeed, Blume and Easley (1982) presented “ (...) a boundedly rational version of Bayesian learning.” (p. 341). Their
agents use a Bayesian decision-theoretic set-up but fail to recognize that the true relationship between prices and states of
nature is intrinsically non-stationary.
8necessary to a rational learning model. On the other hand, Bayesian learning per se is not suﬃcient
to obtain full rationality of the learning process. This is similar to Wieland’s (2000a) notion of myopic
Bayesian decision policies under experimentation. In our binomial lattice set up we derive restrictions on
the priors that ensure that such an equivalence obtains. Although the classical applications of Townsend
(1978) and Frydman (1982) were based on a Bayesian framework, the essence of a rational scheme lies in
agents’ awareness of being on a recursive learning path (see Bray and Kreps (1987, p. 604) for further
discussion). Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out that Bayesian and rational learning give identical equilibrium
prices under a particular choice of the prior in the Bayesian learning scheme.12
4.1. Adaptive Learning
First consider the learning scheme of a ‘frequentist’ agent that views π as non-random but estimates this





Here nt denotes the number of high growth states recorded up to time t,w h i l eNt is the total number of
periods. This maximum likelihood estimator, b πt,i saf u n c t i o no ft h ed i v i d e n dp r o c e s sa n di st h u si t s e l f
a random variable. The key question is whether the agent accounts for parameter estimation uncertainty
and its eﬀect on future asset prices. To show the signiﬁcance of this point, consider the agent’s forecast of
Dt+T. If the agent does not know π but conditions on the most recent estimate, ˆ πt, the forecast becomes














t(1 − ˆ πt)T−j j =0 ,1,...,T.
Obviously, this scheme is fundamentally misspeciﬁed since optimal decisions in the future will be based on
diﬀerent estimates {ˆ πt+k}T
k=1. Equivalently, this learning scheme relies on an application of the certainty
equivalence principle even though the required conditions (e.g. a quadratic objective function) do not
apply, c.f. Gennotte (1986).
4.2. Rational Learning
We start by adapting the following generic deﬁnition from Bray and Kreps (1987, p. 606):
Deﬁnition 2 (Rational Learning). In a rational learning model, the sequence of agents’ optimizing
choices and equilibrium market outcomes are derived:
(i) conditional on agents’ use of all available data relevant to make inferences on π ∈ Π;
(ii) from a statistical framework of belief formation (and updating) concerning π ∈ Π that is consistent
with the resulting sequence of equilibrium market outcomes;
12Blume and Easley (1982, p. 341) put it this way: “Fully rational learning would require each trader to take into account
the eﬀect of his learning (...) on equilibrium prices.”
9(iii) from recursive Bayesian updating of beliefs using a correctly speciﬁed likelihood function for the data,
i.e. incorporating the equilibrium mapping from π ∈ Π to market outcomes.
We note that (i) is a simple eﬃciency requirement that all available information is used to make
optimal decisions. (ii) requires that the sequence of equilibrium market outcomes reﬂects the recursive
belief updating process. It also requires beliefs to account for the mapping from beliefs to market outcomes.
Rational learning thus represents a ﬁxed point in the space of learning strategies (Townsend (1978)). Indeed
(iii) requires the likelihood function for the data to be consistent with the equilibrium mapping from π ∈ Π
to market outcomes.
In the context of our model rational learning implies that agents recursively update their estimate of π,
ˆ πt, using Bayes rule although they need not view π as a random variable.13 They account for estimation
uncertainty in future estimates, ˆ πt+k, and conditions (i) - (iii) in deﬁnition 2 apply so agents forecast
DRL









ˆ E (·|zt+k, ˆ πt+k) conditions on future estimates of π, again assuming that agents use Bayes’ rule to update
the parameter estimates. Under rational learning the entire sequence {ˆ πt, ˆ πt+1,...,ˆ πt+T−1} enters the
forecasting problem and future probability beliefs are recognized to be random (Wieland (2000, p. 507)).
4.3. Bayesian Learning
Bayesian agents perceive π as a random variable and have prior distributions, p(π), over the values that
π can assume. These prior beliefs are recursively updated into posterior beliefs by applying Bayes’ rule.
The estimator for π is chosen to minimize the agent’s loss function which we next derive.14 Deﬁne the
optimal value of the inﬁnite stream of expected future utilities derived from consumption of real dividends
and investment under the true but unknown π :
n

















s.t. ˆ Ct+k(π)+ ˆ ws
t+k(π)St+k +ˆ wb
t+k(π)Bt+k =ˆ ws
t+k−1(π)(St+k + Dt+k)+ ˆ wb
t+k−1(π).





















This loss function is deﬁned over Π ×< + ×< 2 and has values in <+. For a given π ∈ Π, minimization




.S i n c e L(π,a) is a function of the
13This is a subtle distinction: a rational learner always perceives ˆ πt+k (k ≥ 1) as random though π itself is treated as a
random variable only in the Bayesian case.
14Blume and Easley (1984) use a similar decision theoretic approach to study convergence of rational learning in general
equilibrium. Implicitly, they identify their rationality requirement with a Bayesian approach.
10conditional expectation under zt, the optimal consumption-investment plan at time t is also a function of
zt. The investor chooses a decision rule mapping all possible information sets in Ft into an optimal action,
δ(zt):Ft → <+ ×< 2. The loss function, L(π,δ(zt)), can then be written as a mapping from Π × ∆ to
<+, where ∆ is the space of decision rules.










where Ep[·] denotes the expectation over the prior p(π)a n dEzt|π[·] is the expectation over the sample
distribution parameterized by π ∈ Π. We refer to this solution as the Bayes rule, δp(zt).


















p(π|Dt) is the posterior distribution of π given Dt,a n dm(Dt) is the marginal distribution of Dt.
(17) is a functional optimization problem with control δ(Dt) ∈ ∆. Solving this problem is usually a
daunting task but is made easier by the following lemma (c.f. Brown and Purves (1973))





L(π,aj)p(π|(1 + gl)t−j(1 + gh)jD0)dπ j =0 ,1,...,t.
so ˆ aj = ˆ δ
p
((1+gl)t−j(1+gh)jD0) where δp ≡ [δ((1+gl)tD0) δ((1+gl)t−1(1+gh)D0) ... δ((1+gh)tD0)]0.
In practice, the ˆ ajs simply solve consumption-investment problems conditional on the posterior distribution





Eπ|Dt [L(π,aj)] j =0 ,1,...,t.
Eπ|Dt[·] is the expectation taken over the Bayesian posterior distribution of π. This distribution must be
characterized before asset prices can be derived and requires specifying the agent’s priors.
We follow conventional practice in the Bayesian literature and assume that the agent has a beta prior
with parameters n0 and N0, π ∼ beta(n0,N 0 − n0),n 0,N 0 − n0 > 0. The most natural interpretation of
this prior is that the agent has pre-sample information with n0 of N0 realizations being ‘up’.15 This prior,
when combined with the Bernoulli dividend process gives a standard setup, c.f. Zellner (1971, page 39)
and ensures that the posterior p(π|Dt) is also a beta distribution:
15The requirements n0,N 0 − n0 > 0 imply that at least one period of high growth and one period of low growth must have
been observed. When n0 = N0 − n0 = 1 the beta prior becomes uniform.
11Lemma 2. A prior π ∼ beta(n0,N 0 − n0) implies the following posterior on the binomial lattice:
π|(1 + gl)t−j(1 + gh)jD0 ∼ beta(n0 + j,N0 − n0 + t − j) j =0 ,1,...,t.
The beta(c,d) posterior for π incorporates sample information in a simple way: n0 is updated to n0 + j
by adding the number of high growth realizations between time 0 and t, while N0 − n0 is updated to
N0 − n0 +( t − j), where (t − j) is the number of low growth realizations.
5. Equilibrium Asset Prices under Learning
This section derives equilibrium asset prices under the adaptive, rational and Bayesian learning schemes.
As in Brandt et al. (2004) we use a common asset pricing model and vary the learning rules followed by
the representative agent.
5.1. Asset Prices under Adaptive Learning
Suppose that although agents recursively update their current probability estimate, they do not take into
account the eﬀect of future revisions in b πt when computing the current stock price, St. Uncertainty about
π is entirely disregarded. Conditional on agents’ current estimate of the proportion of up-states (b πt), the
































b πt (1 + gh)













As in all adaptive learning models, this formula is generally misspeciﬁed (c.f. Bray and Kreps (1987, pp.
599-600)). Only in the limit as t →∞ , does it follow from the Mann-Wald theorem that ˆ πt converges to
the true π and SAL
t /SFI
t converges to 1.
5.2. Asset Prices under Rational Learning



























16For this to be well-deﬁned we assume that ρ>ˆ πtg
∗
h +(1− ˆ πt)g
∗
l for all t. Given γ and ρ, this may impose restrictions on
the values taken by ˆ πt o nal e a r n i n gp a t h .
12ˆ Et[·] is the expectation operator conditional on the period-t estimate, b πt. Future probability beliefs,
ˆ Et+1, ˆ Et+2,... do not disappear from this expression and have to be accounted for. Since the sequence of
conditional expectations at the nodes t+1,t+2, ..., t+T implied by the Euler condition under RL depends




t+2, ...}, the law of iterated expectations can no longer be applied to reduce
(19) since the distributions over which future expectations are computed depend on future information.
On the binomial lattice, the probability distribution under rational learning, ˆ Et[... ˆ Et+s−1[·]...], can be
fully characterized. We prove in Appendix A that the compound probability distribution for the number














k=0 (Nt − nt + k)
Qs−1
k=0(Nt + k)









(·) = 1. The updated probability distribution of dividends for period t+s only
depends on the number of up-states between periods t and t + s − 1 and is independent of the speciﬁc
path followed on the lattice. Using this result, the equilibrium stock price under rational learning can be
derived by summing the probability-weighted product of the marginal rate of substitution and dividends
across the number of up-states (i)a n dt i m e( s):
SRL
























These ﬁndings lead directly to the stock price under rational learning (RL):


























































The equilibrium bond price under rational learning is
BRL




(1 + gl)−γ + b πt [(1 + gh)−γ − (1 + gl)−γ]
1+ρ
.
Proposition 2 has several implications. First the price-dividend ratio is no longer a constant and depends
on ˆ πt = nt/Nt. Dividend shocks between time t and t + 1 lead to a change in the stock price not only
through the linear relationship, SRL
t = ΨRL
t Dt, but also through revisions to the pricing kernel. Second,
13while under full information the risk-free rate is constant, on a learning path it changes as a function of the
state variables nt and Nt. High dividend growth raises the risk free rate by raising b πt+1 above b πt. Third,
as the rational learning stock price is a time-varying multiple of dividends, stock prices no longer follow
the dividend lattice {gh,g l,π}. On a learning path, a recombining, ﬂexible lattice is needed to capture the
stochastic process of equilibrium stock prices. However, the tree is still recombining so that a period of
high growth followed by one of low growth leads to the same stock price as a period of low price growth












ΨRL(e πt,Nt) (1 + gh)w / p r o b . π
ΨRL(e πd
t+1,Nt+1)




Nt+1 (Ntˆ πt +1 )a n dˆ πd
t+1 ≡ Nt
Nt+1ˆ πt. The capital gain is time-varying and depends on nt and
Nt, as well as on the realized state between t and t +1 . Therefore it changes as we move along the lattice
for ex-dividend stock prices. The (local) volatility of the stock price − in this set up, the size of the jump
in price caused by dividend news − changes over time (as Nt increases deterministically with t)a n da sa
function of the underlying cash index.
The description of equilibrium asset prices on a rational learning path is completed by establishing
restrictions on the values taken by b πt which rule out arbitrage opportunities:
Corollary 1. Under the conditions stated in Proposition 2, the following inequalities are suﬃcient for the












Completeness and absence of arbitrage opportunities are guaranteed by (23), so a unique risk neutral
measure exists for our model although it will be a function of the entire sequence of probability beliefs.
This can most easily be seen by comparing the value as of period t + 1 of one dollar in period t +3w h e n












(1 + gl)−γ +
(nt+1)
(Nt+1) [(1+gh)−γ − (1+gl)−γ]
×
1+ρ
(1 + gl)−γ +
(nt+1)




Nt+2 = b πdu












(1 + gl)−γ + nt
Nt+1 [(1 + gh)−γ − (1 + gl)−γ]
×
1+ρ
(1 + gl)−γ + nt+1
Nt+2 [(1 + gh)−γ − (1 + gl)−γ]
.
Taking the ratio of these two expressions and deﬁning B =[ ( 1+gh)−γ − (1 + gl)−γ], we have




(Nt+1)(Nt+2) (1 + gl)−γB




(Nt+1)(Nt+2) (1 + gl)−γB
,
w h i c hi ng e n e r a ld i ﬀers from unity. For discounting purposes, the exact sequence of dividend realizations
thus matters.
145.3. Asset Prices under Bayesian Learning























































is the optimal plan conditional on current dividends D
j
t =( 1+gl)t−j(1+
gh)jD0. (24) is identical to the consumption-portfolio problem in Section 2, the only diﬀerence lying in
the probability distribution with respect to which the expectation in (24) is taken. Using Lemma 2, asset
prices under Bayesian learning can be characterized as follows:
Proposition 3. Suppose that ρ>max{g∗
l ,g∗
h} and that the Bayesian agent has a beta(n0,N 0 − n0) prior








=0 , ∀π,j, the Bayesian
learning (BL) equilibrium stock price, SBL


























where j is the number of ‘up’ moves in dividends between period 1 and t. The Bayesian learning bond
price, BBL





(1 + gl)−γ +ˆ πt [(1 + gh)−γ − (1 + gl)−γ]
1+ρ
> 0.
5.4. Relationships Between Asset Prices under Bayesian, Rational, and Adaptive Learning
5.4.1 Bayesian and Rational learning
There is a simple relationship between asset prices under the Bayesian and rational learning schemes.





















where the expectation is taken under the RL distribution for future dividends (given b πt and Nt). Under
the assumptions of Proposition 3, SBL
t can be written in a similar way based on the Bayesian predictive




p(Dt+i|π)p(π|Dt)dπ i ≥ 1.
where p(Dt+i|π) is the predictive distribution of future dividends given π and p(π|Dt)i st h ep o s t e r i o rf o r
π. Using Lemma 2, the following result applies:
Proposition 4. Suppose that ρ>max(g∗
l ,g∗
h) and that the Bayesian agent has a beta(n0,N 0 − n0) prior








β (1 + g∗
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t+s =( 1+gl)s−i(1 + gh)iD
j






Γ(n0 + j)Γ(N0 − n0 + t − j)
Γ(n0 + j + i)Γ(N0 + t + s − n0 − j − i)
Γ(N0 + t + s)
. (26)
Provided the Bayesian agent has a beta prior, PBL(Dt+s) follows a beta-binomial distribution with para-
meters (s,N0 + t,N0 + t − n0 − j)a n dPRL {Dt+s} = PBL(Dt+s) so the two asset prices are identical:
Proposition 5. Suppose that ρ>max{g∗
l ,g∗
h}. (i) if the Bayesian agent has a beta(n0,N 0 − n0) prior
density on π and Nt = N0 + t, nt = n0 + j. Then the rational learning (RL) equilibrium stock and bond







(ii) Under diﬀerent priors the rational learning and Bayesian learning asset prices will generally diﬀer.
Of course, Bayesian learning induces a beta distribution only if the agent’s prior follows a beta distribution.
With other, non-conjugate types of priors, diﬀerent posterior and predictive distributions are obtained and
asset prices will be diﬀerent under the two learning schemes. Two points fundamentally distinguish RL
from BL. The ﬁrst is the role of the prior under the Bayesian learning model. A rational learner need
not view π as random but certainly perceives the estimator ˆ πt+k as a random variable. A Bayesian agent
instead adopts a prior over π and regards π as random. Future dividend information is used to update the
posterior density for π.
The second diﬀerence is equally fundamental: while the rational learner is extremely smart and ac-
knowledges the eﬀect of updates in his future beliefs on the current price, the Bayesian agent is myopic
and only accounts for his current beliefs - as reﬂected in the conditional probability distribution for π.
It is only to the extent that the posterior distribution is consistent with the data generating process for
dividends that the myopic Bayesian learning scheme will be rational. If the Bayesian learner used, say,
a truncated normal prior on [0,1], the resulting prices would not be fully rational. Rationality under a
16representative agent’s Bayesian learning scheme hence requires restrictions on the prior distribution which
must be chosen to be consistent with the structure of the model.17
These diﬀerences are deep and represent very diﬀerent learning mechanisms, so it is surprising that the
two approaches can lead to identical asset prices although of course only under restrictive assumptions.
5.4.2 Bayesian and Adaptive Learning
Asset prices under Bayesian and adaptive learning form a general-to-special relation. Suppose the agent
has a degenerate prior
p(π)=
(
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t (Dt) for all dividend levels.18 Adaptive learning can thus be viewed as a special
case of Bayesian learning in which a very particular (infeasible) prior is employed.19 An adaptive learner
eﬀectively conditions on the current estimate of ˆ πt and is systematically surprised by changes to future
values, ˆ πt+k. Apart from this special case, Bayesian and adaptive stock prices diﬀer.
While Bayesian learning provides suﬃcient ﬂexibility to obtain asset prices under adaptive learning as
a special case, the same does not occur for ﬁnite t under rational learning. To see this, write SAL
t as:20
SAL













































RL and AL stock prices can therefore not be identical. Another way to characterize such diﬀerences is
through the speed of the learning clock used by agents to update their beliefs over time. Rational learning
17On the other hand, our result does not impose restrictions on how n0 and N0 are selected (other than n0 6=0 ,n 0 6= N0).





t (Dt) only when the degenerate prior assigns unit mass to a value of π that coincides with the mean of
the beta density.
19This prior is not feasible as ˆ πt is a function of future information unknown at time 0. Hence the probability that this
prior is used is zero and this case is only useful to illustrate the formal relationship between BL and RL stock prices.




t . In general, rational and adaptive learning schemes imply the same
equilibrium asset prices one-period prior to expiration when future learning eﬀects can be disregarded.
17is obtained when the learning clock is updated every time new information arrives. If beliefs are never
updated (i.e. the updating frequency is inﬁnity and the learning clock has stopped), SAL
t is obtained.
Apart from the special case of a degenerate prior, under a rational or Bayesian learning scheme, agents’
probability beliefs form a mean-preserving spread relative to adaptive probability beliefs:
Proposition 6. The probability weights assigned to the tails of the binomial lattice are higher under
rational learning than under adaptive learning. Conversely the adaptive learning scheme puts more weight
on the centre of the lattice.
In fact, the Bayesian and rational learning schemes both adopt a Beta distribution over the unknown value
of π. Under rational learning this is obtained as a limiting result as the horizon, T,g o e st oi n ﬁnity. To
demonstrate this, Figure 1 plots the probability distribution for the proportion of up-states, using diﬀerent
values of the forecast horizon (T = 2, 10, 100, 1000), assuming b πt = 2
10. The probability mass in the tails
is always higher under rational than under adaptive learning.
6. Properties of Asset Prices under Learning
This section explores properties of asset prices and returns under learning. Given the equivalence between
equilibrium asset prices under rational and Bayesian learning under the assumptions of Proposition 5, we
focus on rational learning results.21 Because of its boundedly rational foundations, we disregard adaptive
learning.
Properties of asset prices and returns under rational learning crucially depend on the mapping from
agents’ beliefs, b πt, to stock prices. We ﬁrst establish conditions for monotonicity and convexity of this
mapping:











is a nondecreasing and convex function of b πt = nt
Nt when γ ≤ 1. For γ>1 the pricing function is a
decreasing and convex function of b πt.
Figure 2 illustrates this result when π =0 .6. The other parameters are Nt = 100,g h =+ 6 % ,g l = −4%,
ρ =6 % . The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is either 0.5 or 1.5.
6.1. Serial Correlation and Volatility Clustering
Even when dividend shocks are i.i.d., equilibrium stock returns under learning will in general be serially
correlated and heteroskedastic. Serial correlation in both the level of returns and in squared asset returns
21However, Section 6.3 shows that many of the theoretical ﬁndings in Sections 6.1-6.2 continue to apply to AL and BL under
non-conjugate priors. It is straightforward to prove that Ψ
BL(e πt,N t)i si n c r e a s i n gi ne πt when γ<1, decreasing in e πt when
γ>1, independent of e πt when γ =1 . Therefore, the results of Proposition 8 on serial correlation and volatility clustering
follow more generally.
18is commonly found in empirical studies, c.f. Lo and MacKinlay (1988) and Bollerslev et. al. (1992).
Proposition 8 relates these properties to learning eﬀects. To state the result we deﬁne the continuously






Proposition 8. When dividends evolve on a binomial lattice, the rate of return and the squared rate
of return will be serially uncorrelated under full information rational expectations. However, in general
returns will have a non-zero correlation under learning. Furthermore, if Cov[rRL
t+s,rRL
t ] > 0 and E[rRL
t+s]
and E[rRL





> 0 for s ≥ 1.
The condition that E[rRL
t+s]a n dE[rRL
t ] have the same sign is equivalent to requiring that s cannot be too
large. Otherwise ˆ πt+s could be so diﬀerent from ˆ πt that the expected stock return could change sign. When
serial correlation in returns is attributed to learning, this suggests that we can also expect to ﬁnd volatility
clustering in returns.
In the presence of serial correlation in the estimator, b πt, a monotone ΨRL(b πt,N t)i ss u ﬃcient to produce
serial correlation. In contrast, the heteroskedasticity induced by learning relies on the convexity of the RL
price-dividend ratio: The larger is ˆ πt,t h el a r g e rw i l lb et h ee ﬀect on the asset price of a shock to dividends
through its eﬀect on ΨRL(b πt,N t).
6.2. Excess Volatility
A number of empirical studies have found stock prices to be excessively volatile compared to a full infor-
mation rational expectations benchmark (see Shiller (1981) and Leroy and Porter (1981)). Provided agents
are less risk averse than under log-utility (γ<1), we can show that rational learning generates higher
return volatility than under full information:22
Proposition 9. When 0 ≤ γ<1 the expected stock price under rational learning will exceed the
expected stock price under full information:
E[SRL
t ] >E [SFI
t ].
Furthermore, the variance of stock returns under rational learning exceeds the variance of stock returns
under full information rational expectations:
Va r(rRL
t ) >Va r (rFI
t ).
When γ =1 ,SRL
t = SFI
t , and the moments are identical since the price-dividend ratio is independent of ˆ πt.
When γ>1 no general ranking can be established. A negative covariance between ΨRL
t (ˆ πt)a n dDt lowers
the expected stock price, but the strict convexity of ΨRL
t (ˆ πt) increases the average stock price. Likewise, the
negative covariance between ΨRL
t (ˆ πt)a n dDt leads to lower volatility while the additional price variation
induced by the dependence of the price-dividend ratio on ˆ πt tends to increase it. That learning leads
to higher volatility for low levels of risk aversion is encouraging in the light of the general ﬁnding that
excessive degrees of risk aversion are required to explain movements in asset prices, c.f. Grossman and
Shiller (1981).
22The variance expressions in Proposition 9 consider stock returns since in our model stock prices are nonstationary.
196.3. Simulation Results
To study the quantitative implications of diﬀerent learning schemes for the properties of equilibrium asset
returns, we perform a simulation exercise with parameters calibrated to match real dividend data on
Standard & Poors companies, adjusted to account for inﬂation as measured by the CPI (see Shiller (2000)
for data sources). We supplement these data with value-weighted index returns and 3-month T-bill returns
from CRSP. The data are aggregated to obtain real quarterly series spanning the period 1950:I - 2003:IV, a
total of 216 observations.23 We calibrate the fundamental (dividend) process to gh =+ 1 .7%,g l = −1.5%,
π =0 .565. These parameters imply a maximum annualized real growth rate of 7% and a minimum growth
rate of -5.9% − both plausible values. The annualized real mean growth rate is 1.2% and its volatility is
3.2%, both set to match the sample moments of our real dividend series for 1950-2003. To avoid biases in
our simulation results, we set b π0 ≡ n0/N0 =1 /2, where 1950:I is the initial time period (time 0). This
implies relatively strong learning in the immediate post-WWII period. We set ρ =3 .5% per annum and
use 5000 independent simulations of the 216-quarter path for real dividends, stock prices, and interest rates
and report sample statistics averaged across simulations.
To investigate the importance of the restriction on the prior in Proposition 5 and assess the quantitative
implications across RL and BL schemes, Table 1 considers a third case, Bayesian learning when the prior
is non-conjugate. In particular, we assume that the Bayesian learner initially has a truncated normal (over
(0,1)) prior density on π, with initial parameters μ0 = n0/N0 and σ2
0 = n0(N0 − n0)/[(N0 +1 ) N0]. Since
the problem in this case does not admit closed forms for the posterior distribution and must be handled
through numerical integration, we proceed to recursively update the posterior and calculate the predictive
density of future growth rates.
Table 1 reports sample means and standard deviations for real stock returns, excess stock returns, and
real short-term (3-month) interest rates over our sample. The data display all the typical features that are
well known in the asset pricing literature: high mean excess returns (5.6% per year), low real interest rates
(1.5%), highly volatile excess stock returns (14.9%) and stable interest rates (1.3% annualized volatility).24
There is evidence of both persistence and volatility clustering in stock returns, as shown by the Ljung-Box
statistics in the ﬁrst row of the table. To evaluate this, we follow Lo and MacKinlay (1988) and compute
variance ratios − i.e. the ratio between the variance of q−period stock returns and q times the variance of
annual returns − for q =2 ,...,5. For q = 2 the variance ratio is approximately one (1.04), but as q grows
the ratio declines (e.g. at q = 5 the variance ratio is 0.92), indicating the presence of mean-reversion in
long-horizon stock returns. Second, we report OLS estimates and R2 coeﬃcients in long-horizon predictive





t+j)=a(q)+b(q) · ln(dyt)+ 
q
t,
23For brevity we do not test for or model the presence of structural breaks in fundamentals and simply start our simulations
after WWII. In the presence of an oil shock-related break (as in Timmermann (2001)) in the 1970s, the volatility and risk
premia induced by learning may be higher than what is reported here.
24T h e5 . 6 %m e a ne x c e s ss t o c kr e t u r n si sh e a v i l yi n ﬂuenced by the inclusion of the 2000-2003 period and is closer to the
higher estimate in excess of 6% reported by Mehra and Prescott when based on the sample 1950-1999.
20where r
f
t is the short-term real interest rate and dyt is the dividend yield. Consistent with the literature,
we ﬁnd that both ˆ b(q)a n dR2(q) are monotonically increasing in the horizon, q. For instance, while
ˆ b(2) = 0.17, R2(2) = 0.08, ˆ b(5) = 0.26, R2(5) = 0.19. This indicates predictability of long-horizon returns
from the log-dividend yield.
Table 1 compares the quantitative properties of equilibrium stock and bond returns under alternative
choices of γ and diﬀerent learning schemes. Since Propositions 7 and 9 focus on the case where γ<1, we
start by considering γ =0 .5 and then increase γ to 0.9, and 1.5.25 In the absence of learning (under FI),
stock returns are i.i.d. and the lattice model fails to generate a plausible risk premium, serial correlation,
volatility clustering and suﬃciently volatile stock returns. In addition, the interest rate is too high and
counterfactually constant.26 Conversely, when γ =0 .5, the rational learning model generates very plausible
asset prices with a mean excess return of 2.3%, volatility close to the 15% implied by the data, serial
correlation patterns that approximately match the data (with variance ratios close to one for q =2a n d
signiﬁcantly below one for q =5 )a n dA R C He ﬀects. Furthermore, the dividend yield predicts long-horizon
returns with R2−values close to those estimated from the data. One aspect of the data that is missed
by the RL model is the (average) level of the price-dividend ratio, that is overestimated.27 Finally, Table
1 reveals interesting information on the diﬀerences among learning schemes. AL generates price eﬀects
that are qualitatively similar, but weaker than RL. This is explained by the fact that treating ΨRL as a
random variable and integrating over the inﬁnite sequence of its future values generates stronger volatility,
predictability, and ARCH eﬀects. Both under AL and RL, the resulting price-dividend ratio is too high,
however, and the equilibrium short interest rate is both too high and insuﬃciently volatile (although
learning eﬀects lower it). The same qualitative ﬁnding applies to BL under non-conjugate priors. In this
case learning generates stock returns whose mean is closer to the sample estimate. However, this learning
scheme implies too strong predictability in real stock returns, with high dividend yields predicting negative
long-run returns, and regression coeﬃcients whose magnitude decline in q−features that are at odds with
the empirical evidence.
Panels A and B of Table 1 also illustrate the eﬀect of raising γ. Interestingly−and consistent with
Guidolin’s (2005) results for the RL scheme−under learning, stock return volatility, mean returns, and the
Ljung-Box statistics capturing serial correlation and volatility clustering follow a U-shape when plotted
against γ, with minimum values at γ =1 , the log-utility case. When γ = 1, asset prices under FI and
under learning coincide.28 Across values of γ and across learning schemes, the case that best matches the











h =( 1 .017)






l =( 0 .985)
1−γ − 1f a i l sf o rγ>1.5. Therefore
we restrict our simulations to the range γ ∈ [0.5, 1.5]. Notice also that for γ =1 , Propositions 3-5 imply that the stock price
under learning is identical to the price under FI. Hence we do not use the log-utility case in our simulations.
26Departures from unit variance ratios, zero Ljung-Box statistics, and zero predictability is explained by small sample eﬀects.
27This explains why the predictability regression coeﬃcients in columns 12 and 14 of the table are much larger under RL
than in the data: since RL over-estimates the price-dividend ratios, it also generates too small dividend yields.
28However, mean stock returns as well as short-term interest rates are monotonically increasing in γ.The intuition for why RL
and AL mean excess returns increase as γ goes from 1 to 0.5 is that as we approach risk-neutrality, the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (1/γ) becomes larger and the equilibrium interest rate declines towards ρ, while the convexity of learning pricing
kernels makes upward revisions of the estimated ˆ π more important (in terms of pricing eﬀects) than downward revisions, so
21data is rational learning and γ =1 /2.
An estimate of γ =1 /2 may appear to be well below values required to resolve the equity premium
puzzle. Although most available econometric estimates of γ tend to exceed one-half, this value is not
inconsistent with estimates reported in studies such as Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1983) or Ferson and
Constantinides (1991). Furthermore, the bulk of the econometric evidence comes from models based on a
representative agent who is assumed to know the stationary stochastic process for asset payoﬀsa n ds ot h e
estimates depend on the validity of this assumption. This is important since, in the presence of learning,
the representative agent’s beliefs are themselves subject to time-variation and the investor perceives a non-
stationary process for asset payoﬀs. It is not clear how methodologies could be developed to account for
such non-stationarities, although Table 1 indicates that this may be an important issue. Intuition suggests
that, in the presence of learning, γ controls two types of behavior: (i) agents’ aversion to consumption
risk, as in standard models solved under FI; (ii) the sensitivity of equilibrium asset prices with respect to
revisions in the predictive distribution of π.W h i l e t h e ﬁrst eﬀect is monotonically increasing in γ, the
second is monotonically decreasing in γ. This explains the U-shaped pattern in the mapping from γ into
the equity premium, return predictability and ARCH eﬀects.29
The ability of learning models to modify standard results on what a plausible value for γ is can be
understood in the following simple method of moment framework based on Campbell et al. (1997, pp.
306-307). Under the assumption of homoskedastic and joint normally distributed dividend growth rates










t ]=γCov[rt,g t], (27)
where the equity premium expression ignores a Jensen’s inequality term. As the frequency of movements
on the binomial tree increases, the joint distribution of returns under FI converges to a bivariate Gaussian
distribution (see Cox et al. (1979)). Equation (27) can therefore be expected to capture the moments
of asset returns with high accuracy under FI, while it should only be viewed as a rough but informative
approximation under learning. Using β =( 1+0 .035)−1 =0 .966 on an annualized basis, (27) can be
evaluated using the moments for real dividend growth and stock returns implied by the available time series.
In our data, we have E[gt]=0 .01216,Va r [gt]=0 .00097,C o v [rt,g t]=0 .00079, and Va r[rt]=0 .01459.
Small risk aversion coeﬃcients, e.g. γ =0 .5, generate a plausible risk-free rate but much too low an equity
premium, while a value of γ as high as 71 is required to generate the 5.6% equity premium found in our
that mean stock returns increase compared to the FI case. The result is a considerably higher equity premium than under FI,
see Guidolin (2005).
29We thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this implication of our results. An expanding literature
has obtained results consistent with the notion that many asset pricing phenomena may be explained at relatively low levels
of risk aversion. For instance, David (2004) illustrates that although a declining γ reduces the required compensation for
consumption risk, it also makes agents more aggressive (based on erroneous but credible models of the economy), increases
trading risk, and hence can raise the equity premium.
22data−although the resulting riskless rate becomes negative. For intermediate values of γ (in the range
4-10), small positive equity premia (e.g. 0.8% for γ = 10) and interest rates below 10% per annum can be
generated under FI.
We next argue heuristically why assuming that the representative investor is on a learning path may
generate estimates of γ smaller than what is typically reported in the literature. Using the simulations
underlying the RL results in Table 1, we calculate sample averages of the perceived moments E[gt],Va r [gt],
Cov[rt,g t], and Va r[rt] under RL. In other words, at each step on our simulation paths, we calculate the
predictive density of dividend growth rates and stock returns using (20). We then average these perceptions
over time and across simulations, obtaining ˆ ERL[gt]=0 .01216, d Va rRL[gt]=0 .01025, while d Cov RL[rt,g t]
and d Va r RL[rt] depend on the assumed level of γ. For γ =0 .5w eh a v ed Cov RL[rt,g t]=0 .02464, d Va r
RL[rt]=0 .01593, so (27) implies an equity premium of 1.3%, a plausible mean stock return of 5.2%, and
a short-term interest rate of 3.9%. Although these values do not perfectly match the sample moments,
γ =0 .5 appears to adequately trade oﬀ several competing moments. Rational learning eﬀects magnify the
perception of the riskiness of the fundamental process and the perception of a high degree of correlation
between the real dividend growth rate and stock returns since the price-dividend ratio ΨRL is increasing
in b πt for γ<1.
7. Extensions of the Model
Since the seminal paper by Cox et al. (1979), the binomial lattice has played a key role in the development
of ﬁnance theory. However, it is of interest to see whether our analysis applies to a more general setup
where the dividend growth rate can take more than two values at each point in time or the state transitions
are allowed to follow a Markov process. Sections 7.1 - 7.2 show that the result that BL and RL equilibrium
asset prices are identical under restrictions on the choice of the prior generalizes both to multi-state and to
Markovian processes. Section 7.3 discusses the limitations arising from our assumption of a representative
investor and points to ways in which our analysis may carry over to environments with heterogeneous
investors.
7.1. Generalization to a Multinomial Lattice
First, we show that relaxing the assumption that gt+j can only take two possible values is not important for
our result on the equivalence of BL and RL asset prices under restrictions on the choice of the (conjugate)
priors. Suppose that ∀t ≥ 1,g t can take K ≥ 2 possible values, {g1,g 2, ..., gK} with probabilities {π1,π 2,
..., πK} such that
PK
k=1 πk =1 , i.e. the probability distribution is deﬁned over the K simplex. In this case
gt is drawn from a multinomial distribution with K possible outcomes. Furthermore, assume that under
BL the investor has a Dirichlet prior with parameters {n1,0,n 2,0, ..., nK,0},n k,0 > 0, k =1 ,...,K, such



















23The Dirichlet prior is simply a vector generalization of the beta distribution. Once again, the most natural
interpretation is that the agent has pre-sample information with nk,0 realizations of the dividend growth
rate, gk,k=1 ,...,K, where N0 is the total number of pre-sample observations. Since the Dirichlet prior
is conjugate for multinomial distributions, the resulting posterior for p(π1,π2,...,πK|zt) is also Dirichlet




k=1 Xk,t}, where Xk,t is a counter that
measures the number of realizations of the dividend growth rate that ‘fall’ in the k−th cell, k =1 ,...,K
(see Zellner (1971) for a proof).
If the probabilities {π1,π 2, ..., πK} were known, the FI equilibrium asset prices could be found, subject




k ≡ (1 + gk)










































k=1 πk(1 + gk)−γ
1+ρ
. (29)
Clearly, (28)-(29) reduce to (11)-(12) in the special case where K = 2 and the dividend growth rate evolves
on a binomial lattice. BL asset prices are then obtained as an extension of Proposition 3. Under a similar
set of assumptions (including a Dirichlet prior), SBL
t is given by
SBL























k dπ1 · dπ2 · ... · dπK,


















Here ˆ πk,t ≡
nk,0+Xk,t,
N0+t a n dw eu s e dt h a tp(π1,π2,...,πK|zt) is also Dirichlet so E[πk|zt]=
R 1
0 πkp(πk|zt)dπk









































=( 1+g1)X1,s(1 + g2)X2,s × ... × (1 + gK)s−
SK−1







i=0 (n1,t + i)
QX2,s−1










In fact, the compound probability of a particular path of states between periods t +1a n dt + s equals
Qs−1
i=0 jk





t+i{a,b} is again the selection operator that takes the value a if the growth rate equals gk (k =
1,...,K)a tt i m et + i, and otherwise equals b.( Nt + i − Xk,t+i) increases by unity each time the growth
rate diﬀers from gk, so all paths with the same number of occurrences of the k−th state between periods





paths so the states characterized by growth rates {g1,g 2, ..., gK} occur {X1,s,X 2,s, ..., s −
PK−1
k=1 Xk,s}
times between t +1a n dt + s. Equation (30) simpliﬁes to (20) when K =2 .
Subject to a transversality condition and ρ>maxk{g∗




























k,s m =1 ,...,M(s)






k,s} given by the m-th combination.31 At this point, it is tedious but straightforward to




























































It is easy to show for multinomial distributions that the optimal (maximum likelihood) estimator of πk i st h es a m p l ef r e q u e n c y ,
thus justifying the RL construction in (30).



















































k dπ1 ·dπ2...·dπK (m =1 ,...,M(s)) can be recognized as the kernel




nk,0 + Xk,t + Xm
k,s
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n0k + Xk,t + Xm
k,s
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n0k + Xk,t + Xm
k,s
´
Γ(N0 + t + s)
(31)
is the probability distribution of a Dirichlet multinomial mixture with parameters {s,n1,0 +X1,t+X1,s,...,



















t if and only if PBL(Dt+s | ˆ π1,t,...,ˆ πK,t,N t)=PRL (Dt+s | ˆ π1,t,...,ˆ πK,t,N t) ∀m. Com-
paring (30) to (31) follows the lines of the proof of Proposition 5 and amounts to showing that
QX1,s−1
i=0 (n1,t + i)
QX2,s−1
















n0k + Xk,t + Xm
k,s
´
Γ(N0 + t + s)
.





k=1 ˆ πk,t(1 + gk)−γ
1+ρ
.
Finally, notice that our ﬁnding that under conjugate Dirichlet priors, equilibrium asset prices under
RL and BL coincide when fundamentals follow a multinomial tree has − at least as an approximation −
some additional degree of generality. From Chamberlain (1987) we know that any generic identically and
independently distributed random variable {gt+k} with distribution function Fg over a support Zg ⊂ Z
can be approximated arbitrarily well by a multinomial distribution, in the sense that for any measurable
function h : Z → R such that
R
||h|| · dF < ∞ there exists a multinomial probability measure G whose
support is a ﬁnite subset of Z and
R
h · dF =
R
h · dG. Insofar as the process of the fundamentals growth
rate is i.i.d., it follows that an appropriately selected multinomial process can represent such a process.
This implies that RL and BL equilibrium prices are identical when Bayesian investors maintain a particular
(conjugate) prior.
267.2. Generalization to First-Order Markov Dynamics
Many papers in the asset pricing literature have stressed the need to produce realistic equilibrium asset
price and return processes when fundamentals follow smooth, i.i.d. processes (see e.g. Abel, 2002). So far
we have shown that, under conjugate priors and when dividends follow a multinomial process, RL and BL
asset prices coincide. Given the ability of multinomial processes to approximate other stochastic processes,
this result is quite general. Still, the assumption of i.i.d. increments to dividends is quite restrictive and
authors such as Mehra and Prescott (1985) have used ﬁrst-order Markov processes. We therefore next show
how some of our ﬁndings on RL and BL prices can be extended to this important case. After introducing
details of the dividend process, we derive BL and RL equilibrium prices and then show that choices of the
BL prior exist under which the two sets of prices coincide. To keep notations simple, we investigate the
case with two states (K = 2), as in Sections 2-6.
Suppose that dividends evolve on a lattice but now let the probability of a high (low) growth rate
between t and t +1 ,g t+1, depend on the growth rate between t − 1a n dt, gt. In particular, assume that
dividends follow a stationary, irreducible ﬁrst-order Markov process for which P{gt+1|zt} = P{gt+1|gt}:
gt+1 =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
gh
(
with prob. πhh if gt = gh
with prob. 1 − πll if gt = gl
gl
(
with prob. 1 − πhh if gt = gh
with prob. πll if gt = gl
πhh,πll ∈ (0,1). (32)
We collect the transition probabilities in a matrix P:
P ≡
"
πhh 1 − πhh
1 − πll πll
#
.







Sample information can be organized in a frequency count matrix FT with generic element fij,T =
PT
l=1 I{gl=gj,gl−1=gi},i , j=‘high’, ‘low’, that keeps track of the number of transitions between the states.
















j=l,h nij,0. Once again, the natural interpretation of this prior is that the investor has pre-sample
information with nij,0 realizations of dividend growth rate transitions from gi to gj, where N0 is the total
number of such pre-sample observations. Since the matrix Beta prior is conjugate for problems of transition
matrix estimation of ﬁrst-order Markov chains, the resulting posterior p(P|zt,N0) is also matrix Beta with












27If the transition matrix P were known, the FI equilibrium asset price could be found using methods
similar to those in Mehra and Prescott (1985), so that, subject to standard transversality conditions,
SFI










t (gt+1 = j)
Dt+1
¶








∀i,j. Equation (33) can be written as a system of two equations in two






πhh (1 + g∗
h)(1+ΨFI













Closed-form expressions exist but are not particularly insightful. Hence, we can express the FI stock price
for K =2a s :
SFI
t (gt = i)=β
©
πih (1 + g∗
h)(1+ΨFI




Dt i = l,h,
which is easy to compute once ΨFI
l and ΨFI
h are known from (34). When πhh =1− πll = π, each of the
equations produces a FI pricing kernel identical to that in (28). The equilibrium risk-free rate remains a
function of the current state:
BFI(gt = i)=E
£
β(1 + gt+1)−γ|gt = i
¤
=
πih(1 + gh)−γ + πil(1 + gl)−γ
1+ρ
i = l,h.
BL asset prices are obtained as an extension of Proposition 3. Under the same assumptions, SBL
t is a
function of current dividend growth and is given by
SBL





























































ˆ πih(1 + gh)−γ +ˆ πil(1 + gl)−γ
1+ρ
i = l, h,
where ˆ πij ≡
nij,0+fij,t
nil,0+fil,t+nih,0+fih,t a n dw eu s e dt h a tp(P|zt,N0) is also matrix Beta so that (see e.g. Billard
and Meshkani, 1995):
E[πij|zt,N0]=
Γ(nil,0 + fil,t + nih,0 + fih,t)
QK





ij dπij =ˆ πij.
28Once again, assuming that a rational learner recursively updates the maximum likelihood estimate
ˆ πij ≡
nij,0 + fij,t
nil,0 + fil,t + nih,0 + fih,t
i = l, h
(where the nij,0s are initial values of the frequency counters such that ni,0 ≡ nil,0+nih,0 and N0 ≡ nl,0+nh,0),












































(i = l,h)w h e r eA(s,,fhh,t+s,f ll,t+s) is the set collecting all paths of dividends such that
Dt+s
Dt
=( 1+gh)(fhh,t+s−fhh,t)+(flh,t+s−flh,t)(1 + gl)(fhl,t+s−fhl,t)+(fll,t+s−fll,t).
Once s is ﬁxed, fhh,t,f ll,t,f hh,t+s and fll,t+s are suﬃcient statistics for all transitions between the two
states and so the set over which the probabilities need to be summed will depend only on how forward-
looking the investor is (s)a n do nfhh,t+s and fll,t+s. In this case, the probabilities of a given dividend








will depend on: (i) the initial state gt; (ii) the exact sequence of high and low growth rates.32 As a
consequence of (ii), notice that (??) now no longer relies on binomial coeﬃcients to account for the fact
that there may exist multiple paths of the growth rates leading to the same ﬁnal dividend level Dt+s.
Obviously, such simpliﬁcation applies whenever the RL probabilities become path-independent, in which
case − because fα
it+ljt+l−1,t = fα
jt+ljt+l−1,t ≡ fα


































32For instance, when s =2 , the four expressions
P















































Dt =(1+gh)(1+gl) | ˆ πhh,t, ˆ πll,t,N t,g t=h
r
, while the sum








PRL{h,l|ˆ πhh,t, ˆ πll,t,N t,g t=h} =
hQ0
k=0 nhh,0 + fα
hh,t + k
ihQ0
































When state transitions are independent of the current state so P{gh|zt} = π ∈ (0,1) ∀t, (35) reduces to
(20). For instance, using our example,














N0 + nt +( t − nt)
×
N0 − n0 +( t − nt)





N0 − n0 +( t − nt)
N0 + t +1
.
Subject to a transversality condition and ρ>{g∗
l ,g∗
h}, the stock price under RL is then
SRL





































































































The BL price implies evaluating integrals of the form
Γ(nil,0 + fil,t + nih,0 + fih,t)
Q











il dπihdπil i = l,h, ∀α ∈ A(s,fhh,t+q,f ll,t+q).





























































ih,t+q + nil,0 + fα
il,t+q
´ .(36)
Equation (36) is similar to expressions appearing in the proof of Proposition 5 (see the Appendix), with t
replaced by fil,t+fih,t (the total number of recorded transitions from state i = l,h up to time t), j replaced
by fα
ih,t,n 0 by nih,0,N 0 by nil,0 + nih,0, and i by fα
ih,t+q − fα

















which is the same as (35). Since, for all s ≥ 0, the RL probabilities coincide with those under the BL





Although the complexity of the notations increases in K, a similar logic could be applied to prove that
BL and RL asset prices coincide when the BL prior is taken to be an appropriate matrix Beta for the
general case with an m−th order Markov chain and K>2s t a t e s .
The results so far demonstrated that equilibrium prices under BL and RL are identical for suitable
choices of the priors that are conjugate with respect to the dividend process. When {gt} follows a binomial
lattice, the prior should be Beta; when {gt} follows a general multinomial tree with K possible states, the
prior should be Dirichlet, a vector generalization of a Beta; when {gt} follows a ﬁrst-order Markov process
with unknown transition probability matrix, the suitable prior is a matrix Beta, a further multivariate
generalization of the standard Beta. One may therefore conjecture that the use of a conjugate prior might
be at least suﬃcient (if not necessary) for BL and RL equilibrium prices to be identical. This conjecture
is, however, incorrect and it is easy to construct counter-examples where this does not hold.33
7.3. Heterogeneity
Our analysis has explored the implications of various learning schemes for equilibrium asset prices under
the simplifying assumption that only the learning of the ‘average’, representative agent matters. Extending
our results on the diﬀerential impact of alternative learning schemes to cover heterogeneous agents runs
into three complications. First, heterogeneity may give agents an incentive to learn from the observed
(aggregate) market outcomes. While this does not pose any principal diﬃculties, in practice it becomes
more diﬃcult to characterize the equilibrium. Second, strategic incentives may emerge if a group of agents
33Under Gaussian IID dividend growth, the perceived distribution for the s−step cumulative dividend growth under BL or
RL diﬀer for s ≥ 2. While for s = 1 the rational learner will believe that the predictive density for Dt+1/Dt is Gaussian, for
s ≥ 2 the predictive distribution of future dividend growth rates fails to be Gaussian and is instead a mixture of Gaussian
variables, with mixing weights that depend on future realizations of the dividend growth rate.
31realize that equilibrium market outcomes depend on their own beliefs and actions. Third, existing papers
focus on the eﬀect of heterogeneity in beliefs, while other forms of heterogeneity−chieﬂy in preference
parameters−may matter. Results in Constantinides (1982) suggest that problems caused by heterogeneity
in beliefs get compounded with possible diﬀerences in preferences.
Heterogeneity is undoubtedly important in practice, so it is worthwhile brieﬂy considering how our
results might be altered by such eﬀects. Since we work with power utility, results in Rubinstein (1974)
imply that an aggregation result holds whereby a representative agent exists if all individuals populating
the economy have identical time preference parameters {ρi}I
i=1, identical coeﬃcients of relative risk aver-
sion {γi}I
i=1, and identical beliefs.34 These are strong restrictions, not very dissimilar from imposing the
existence of a single agent. Moreover, even if one found these assumptions acceptable, it would not resolve
issues such as the no-trade theorem which implies a zero trading volume in this type of model.
Recent papers provide pointers for how investor heterogeneity may aﬀect equilibrium asset prices.
Kurz et al. (2005) present a model in which the dynamics of diversity of beliefs is the primary propagation
mechanism in asset markets. In their model the distribution of the conditional probabilities of future market
states is an endogenous element of the state vector. Interestingly, this requires that each investor must
forecast the beliefs of the other investors, which is a typical Keynesian “Beauty Contest” eﬀect. Calibrations
suggest that such a model is successful not only at matching moments of asset returns (including the equity
premium), but also can match the predictability features of US stock returns and generate stochastic
volatility. A key diﬀerence between this paper and ours is that Kurz et al. (2005) use the rational belief
principle in Kurz (1994) to model how agents use subjective models.
Dumas et al. (2005) study a ﬁltering problem with two classes of agents that receive a public signal that
is informative about future dividend growth. One class of agents uses the correct model speciﬁcation while
the other uses a misspeciﬁed model and overreacts to information, alternating between being excessively
pessimistic and optimistic. When the rational traders fail to dominate the economy, asset prices can be
strongly aﬀected by the overconﬁdent agents and prices become excessively volatile. Moreover, irrational
traders may survive for a long time before being driven out of the market by the rational investors−see
also Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005).
8. Conclusion
We have characterized equilibrium asset prices under three learning schemes in the context of an inﬁnite-
horizon equilibrium model where dividends evolve on a binomial lattice and agents have power utility.
Since asset prices are a function of agents’ beliefs, the probability distribution of asset prices reﬂect agents’
learning.
The binomial lattice model analyzed in this paper is the standard tool used to derive the Black-Scholes
34These assumptions can be relaxed under log-utility (γ = 1), since markets are complete (learning does not aﬀect equilibrium
outcomes in this case): aggregation would follow simply from imposing that all individuals have identical resources and time
preference parameters, see Rubinstein (1974, p. 232). Otherwise markets are complete under FI (see Cox et al. (1979)),
although they are possibly perceived as incomplete on a rational learning path (i.e. for ﬁnite T) because the risk posed by
future variations in the price-dividend ratio is not tradable.
32option pricing formula as the continuous time limit of a discrete time model. When learning is introduced
into the model, option prices will change because the level and volatility of the underlying asset price
change. Empirical researchers have found systematic biases when attempting to ﬁt the Black Scholes
model to a cross-section of option prices. Guidolin and Timmermann (2003) derive option prices based on
the recursive learning model discussed here and ﬁnd that the model is able to generate implied volatility
smiles. They ﬁnd that option pricing models that incorporate recursive learning eﬀects produce equally
good or better forecasts than several benchmarks provided by the empirical option pricing literature.
Although learning will disappear asymptotically in the current setting (see the discussion in Lewellen
and Shanken (2002)), it is easy to modify the setup to prevent this from happening. For example, the true
π may be subject to occasional structural breaks which would reset the learning clock so learning eﬀects do
not die out but recur after a break (c.f. Timmermann (2001) and Beck and Wieland (2002)). Alternatively
agents may believe that the true value of π is subject to slow changes and use a rolling window rather than
an expanding window to estimate π as a means of robustifying their beliefs with respect to nonstationarities
in the fundamentals process. These extensions are trivial conceptually, but complicate the derivation of
asset prices. For example, the use of a rolling estimation window for π introduces path dependence in
agents’ beliefs and makes an analytical treatment diﬃcult.
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Appendix A
Derivation of Equation (22). Let Xt+k be a counter that measures the number of realizations of the
high-growth state up to period t + k:
Xt+k = Xt+k−1 + ιt+k,k ≥ 1.
Here ιt+k is an indicator function taking the value one if the high growth state occurs in period t+k,a n d









where jt+k{a,b} is a selection operator that takes the value a if the high growth state occurred at time
t+k,o t h e r w i s ei sb.( Nt +k−Xt+k) increases by one each time the low growth state appears, so all paths
with the same number of low growth states between periods t +1a n dt + k have the same probability.




diﬀerent paths with i up-states and (s−i) down-states occurring
between t +1a n dt + s. 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .Iterating on the Euler equation (8), from the law of iterated expectations
SFI




















Taking the limit as T →∞ , imposing the transversality condition limT→∞ Et[(
QT
k=1 Qt+k)St+T] =0, and

























Under power utility the pricing kernel is Qt+k = β (1 + gt+k)
−γ . Using that dividend growth follows an
























Here we used that ρ>g ∗
l + π(g∗
h − g∗
l ) guarantees that the sum converges and is positive. Since gl >




l ) > 0. Finally, we check if the transversality
condition limT→∞ Et[
QT
k=1 Qt+k St+T] = 0 imposes additional restrictions on the parameter space. From
































37In the limit as T →∞ , this is zero if and only if ρ>g ∗
l + π(g∗
h − g∗
l ), as assumed.






(1 + gl)−γ + π [(1 + gh)−γ − (1 + gl)−γ]
1+ρ
.
Since 1 + gt+1 is positive, ρ>−1 is necessary and suﬃcient to obtain a positive bond price. Under the
restriction 1+ρ>(1+gl)−γ+π[(1 + gh)−γ − (1 + gl)−γ],B FI < 1 and the risk-free rate is always positive.
But this is satisﬁed as 1 + ρ>1+g∗
l + π(g∗
h − g∗
l )=Et[(1 + gt+k)
1−γ]. 2


















Since ˆ aj minimizes Λ(π,δ(D
j
t)), then δp =ˆ a ≡ [ˆ a0 ˆ a1 ... ˆ at]0 also minimizes Λ(π,δ). 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .Using the Euler equation (8), taking the limit as T →∞under the transversality
condition, we obtain
SRL













= Dt · ΨRL
t (b πt,N t;gh,g l,γ,ρ).
The bond price follows directly from (9) and using ρ>−1, 0 ≤ b πt ≤ 1:
fRL
t = −lnBRL
t (b πt)=l n
Ã
1+ρ







The ﬁnal part of the result is the convergence of the inﬁnite sum (21) or, equivalently, the existence of the
RL equilibrium. ρ>g ∗
l is necessary and suﬃcient for the equilibrium to exist when γ>1. Indeed, when
γ>1,g ∗
l >g ∗



















if and only if ρ>g ∗
l . When pricing the stock, agents must also integrate over the sequence of




=1 ,s oρ>g ∗
l is necessary and suﬃcient. When γ<1,ρ>g ∗
h
is necessary and suﬃcient. In this case g∗
h >g ∗











if and only if ρ>g ∗
h. Since this inequality must hold for all future periods, ρ>g ∗
h














h} is necessary and suﬃcient for the equilibrium to exist.35 2





























38Proof of Proposition 3. The Euler equations under BL are
SBL
t = Eπ|Dt {Et,π [Qt+1(St+1 + Dt+1) | Dt,π]}
BBL
t = Eπ|Dt {Et,π [Qt+1 | Dt,π]},
where Et,π[·] is the expectation conditional on Dt and π. Throughout the proof we suppress the dependence










































where we used that
Et,π [p(π|Dt+k)] = p(π|Dt) ∀k ≥ 0,
is a martingale process (c.f. Bray and Kreps (1987, p. 609)). In the limit as T →∞ , from the transversality
condition limT→∞ Et,π[(
QT














= DtEπ|Dt [Ψt,π(gh,g l,γ,ρ)],




















































(1 + gl)−γ + π[(1 + gh)−γ − (1 + gl)−γ]
1+ρ
p(π|Dt)dπ =
(1 + gl)−γ +ˆ πt [(1 + gh)−γ − (1 + gl)−γ]
1+ρ
.
where ˆ πt ≡
n0+j
N0+t a n dw eu s e dt h a tπ|D
j










t (j) < 1 and the risk-free rate is always positive. 2









When γ =1 , ΨRL
t = ΨFI = 1
ρ.W h e n γ<1, using a result from Proposition 7 it follows that under
pessimism (ˆ πt <π ) ΨRL
t < ΨFI, while optimism (ˆ πt ≥ π) leads to ΨRL
t ≥ ΨFI. When γ>1, pessimism
implies ΨRL
t > ΨFI, while optimism means ΨRL
t ≤ ΨFI.
39It is straightforward to prove that, under FI, gh >g l > −1i ss u ﬃcient for the absence of arbitrage
opportunities. The strategy of our proof therefore consists of establishing, when possible, FI bounds for
RL gross stock returns. When these bounds cannot be proved, the conditions in Corollary 1 are required
to prevent the existence of arbitrage opportunities. When γ =1 , FI and RL stock prices coincide so
that no further conditions are needed. For γ 6= 1, we study four diﬀerent cases, using the deﬁnitions
ˆ πu
t+1 ≡ 1
Nt+1 (Ntˆ πt +1 )a n dˆ πd
t+1 ≡ Nt
Nt+1ˆ πt.
(a) γ<1a n dˆ πt <π . ΨRL
t < ΨFI and ΨRL
t+1 is increasing in ˆ πt+1 (see Proposition 7), so
1+ΨRL(ˆ πu
t+1,N t +1 )
ΨRL(ˆ πt,N t)

















The absence of arbitrage opportunities under FI is suﬃcient for the right hand side of this equation to hold






(1 + gh) >
1+ρ
(1 + gl)−γ + π [(1 + gh)−γ − (1 + gl)−γ]
>
1+ρ
(1+gl)−γ + b πt [(1+gh)−γ − (1+gl)−γ]
,
However this does not hold for the left hand side of (23) so we must impose the restriction
1+ΨRL(ˆ πd
t+1,N t +1 )
ΨRL(ˆ πt,N t)
(1 + gl) <
1+ρ
(1 + gl)−γ + b πt [(1 + gh)−γ − (1 + gl)−γ]
.
(b) γ<1a n dˆ πt ≥ π. ΨRL
t ≥ ΨFI and ΨRL
t+1 is increasing in ˆ πt+1, so
1+ΨRL(ˆ πd
t+1,N t +1 )
ΨRL(ˆ πt,N t)

















By arguments similar to those in (a), absence of arbitrage opportunities under FI implies their absence
under rational learning as well. However this does not hold for the right hand side of (23) and restrictions
on the parameters must be imposed.
(c) γ>1a n dˆ πt <π .S i n c eΨRL
t > ΨFI and ΨRL
t+1 is decreasing in ˆ πt+1, a series of inequalities similar
to those in (b) imply that absence of arbitrage opportunities under FI is suﬃc i e n tf o rt h el e f th a n ds i d eo f
the rational learning no-arbitrage conditions to hold. This does not hold for the right hand side.
(d) γ>1a n dˆ πt ≥ π.S i n c eΨRL
t ≤ ΨFI and ΨRL
t+1 is decreasing in ˆ πt+1, a series of inequalities identical
to those in (a) imply that the absence of arbitrage opportunities under FI guarantees that the right hand
side of (23) holds. This does not apply to the left hand side.
When γ<1, (a) - (b) imply that on a rational learning path where optimism and pessimism can
alternate, the condition in the corollary should be imposed and checked at all nodes of the binomial lattice.
(c) and (d) have the same implication when γ>1. 2






















βs (1 + g∗
l )















βs (1 + g∗
l )








































Γ(n0 + j)Γ(N0 + t − n0 − j)
Γ(j + i + n0)Γ(t + N0 + s − n0 − j − i)




0 πj+i+n0−1(1 − π)t+N0+s−n0−j−i−1dπ is a beta function βf(c,d)a n dβf(c,d)=Γ(c)Γ(d)/Γ(c + d).
The last line is the probability function of a beta-binomial distribution with parameters (s,N0 + t,N0 +
t − n0 − j). Deﬁning PBL(Dt+s) as this discrete probability distribution,







Γ(n0 + j)Γ(N0 + t − n0 − j)
Γ(j + i + n0)Γ(t + N0 + s − n0 − j − i)
Γ(N0 + t + s)
,










βs (1 + g∗
l )






P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .Comparing PRL to the expression for PBL, the only diﬀerence between the










j=1 I{gj=gh} + k)
s−i−1 Q
k=0
(N0 − n0 + t −
Pt
j=1 I{gj=gh} + k)
s−1 Q
k=0
(N0 + t + k)
and the ratios of gamma products
Γ(N0 + t)
Γ(n0 + j)Γ(N0 + t − n0 − j)
Γ(j + i + n0)Γ(t + N0 + s − n0 − j − i)
Γ(N0 + t + s)
.
36Throughout, we suppress the dependence of Dt on j (the number of ‘up’ moves).
41While these terms may appear to be very diﬀerent, notice that
Γ(N0 + t)
Γ(n0 + j)Γ(N0 + t − n0 − j)
Γ(j + i + n0)Γ(t + N0 + s − n0 − j − i)
Γ(N0 + t + s)
=[ ( t + N0 + s − n0 − j − i − 1) × (t + N0 + s − n0 − j − i − 2) × ... × (N0 + t − n0 − j)]
×
[(n0 + j + i − 1) × (n0 + j + i − 2) × ... × (n0 + j)]











(t − n0 −
Pt
k=1 I{gk=gh} + k)
¸
Qs−1














βs (1 + g∗
l )





The second part of the proof follows from noting that the above factorization does not work if a non-beta
prior is used. 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 .We need to establish conditions under which the compound probability of i
up-states and s−i down-states under the rational learning rule exceeds the probability under the adaptive



























































It is easily veriﬁed that this expression is positive when i is either very large (“close to s”) or very small
(“close to zero”). Also, the expression is monotonically decreasing as a function of i for i<(s − 1)nt/Nt,
and increases for i>(s − 1)nt/Nt. Both sides of the ﬁrst inequality sum up to one and the left hand side
has larger probability mass in the tails, so it follows that the probability distribution over the proportion
of up-states under RL is a mean-preserving spread relative to the probability distribution under AL. 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 .Consider the RL pricing kernel,





















and PRL (i|b πt,N t) ≡ PRL ¡
Dt+s =( 1+gh)i(1 + gl)s−i|b πt,N t
¢
.C l e a r l y ,α T 1i fa n do n l y








42where i is the number of up moves of the dividend out of a total of s steps. i is a realization of a random
variable with discrete distribution {PRL (i|b πt,N t)}T
i=0.
When γ<1,α>1s oαi is strictly increasing in i. For b π0




























= ΨRL(ˆ πt,N t).
The RL pricing kernel is therefore monotonically increasing in ˆ πt. Conversely, when γ>1,α<1a n dαi
is strictly decreasing in i. It then follows that ΨRL(ˆ π0
t,N t) < ΨRL(ˆ πt,N t), as claimed.
To establish convexity of ΨRL(ˆ πt,N t), we need to show that
ˆ πtΨRL(ˆ πu)+( 1− ˆ πt)ΨRL(ˆ πd) > ΨRL
³
ˆ πtˆ πu +( 1− ˆ πt)ˆ πd
´
= ΨRL (ˆ π∗)=ΨRL (ˆ πt),
where ˆ πd =ˆ πt − 1
Nt and ˆ πu =ˆ πt + 1
Nt. The last equality follows from






































Nt − nt − 1
Nt − nt + s − i − 1
¸
PRL(i|ˆ πt),

















Adding these together, we have














Nt − nt − 1
Nt − nt + s − i − 1
+( 1− ˆ πt)
nt − 1
nt + i − 1









Nt − nt − 1
Nt − nt + s − i − 1
+
nt − 1
nt + i − 1
Nt − nt + s − i
Nt − nt
¸

























k=0(nt + k +1 )
Qs−i−1
k=0 (Nt − nt + k − 1)
Qs
k=0(Nt + k)











k=0(nt + k − 1)
Qs−i−1




t +( 1− ˆ πt)ˆ πd
t =ˆ πt.





Nt − nt − 1
Nt − nt + s − i − 1
+( 1− ˆ πt)
nt − 1
nt + i − 1
Nt − nt + s − i
Nt − nt
¸
is greater than one when i is either close to zero or s and is otherwise less than one, showing that probability
mass is shifted from the center of the distribution to the tails. Further calculations show that as long as i is
small, ˘ PRL
t (i|ˆ πt) >PRL
t (i|ˆ πt). Likewise, it is possible to show that when i is large, ˘ PRL
t (i|ˆ πt) >PRL
t (i|ˆ πt).
Since ˆ πtΨRL(ˆ πu
t )+( 1− ˆ πt)ΨRL(ˆ πd





l )s−i ˘ PRL(i|ˆ πt), the function h(i)=( 1 + g∗
h)i(1 + g∗
l )s−i (i ≤ s) is increasing and convex in i,a n d
˘ PRL
t (i|ˆ πt) is a mean preserving spread of PRL
t (i|ˆ πt). Moving probability mass to the good states (1 + g∗
h)
thus more than compensates shifting mass to the bad states (1 + g∗
l ) and the result follows from

















l )s−iPRL(i|ˆ πt)=ΨRL(ˆ πt).
When γ = 1, the proof is trivial since ΨRL(b πt)=1
ρ, so ΨRL
t is a constant that does not depend on b πt and
therefore is convex.
When γ>1, (1 + g∗
h) < (1 + g∗
l )s ob π0
t > b πt shifts probability mass from the good to the bad state.
Therefore ΨRL





l )s−i ˘ PRL(i|ˆ πt), the function h(i)=( 1 + g∗
h)i(1+g∗
l )s−i (i ≤ s) is decreasing and convex
in i,a n d˘ PRL(i|ˆ πt) is a mean preserving spread of PRL(i|ˆ πt). It follows that moving probability mass to the
‘good’ states more than compensates shifting mass to the ‘bad’ states so that ˆ πtΨRL(ˆ πu)+(1−ˆ πt)ΨRL(ˆ πd) >
ΨRL(ˆ πt). 2














= k +l n ( 1+gt+s),





is a nonlinear function of the FI price-dividend ratio. Let Cov(·)d e n o t et h e
covariance under the true (but unknown) probability measure π.N o w
Cov(rFI
t+s,rFI
t )=Cov[ln(1 + gt+s),ln(1 + gt)] = 0 ∀j ≥ 1,
since the dividend growth rate is assumed to be independently distributed over time, and, for independently









[ln(1 + gt+j)]2,[ln(1 + gt)]
2
´
=0 ∀j ≥ 1.
Hence under FI, there is neither serial correlation nor heteroskedasticity in stock returns.









=l n ( 1+ΨRL
t+s) − lnΨRL
t+s−1 +l n ( 1+gt+s),
44where ΨRL





































since Cov[ln(1 + gt+s),ln(1 + gt)] = Cov
£
ln(1 + ΨRL
t ),ln(1 + gt+s)
¤
= Cov[lnΨRL
t−1, ln(1 + gt+s)] = 0. For























































π2 − π2 =0 .





i=1 I{gt+i=gh} are independent
by construction. By Jensen’s inequality, E[ˆ π2
t] > {E[ˆ πt]}
2 = π2. Since ΨRL
t is a monotonic function
of ˆ πt, and the transformations ln(1 + ΨRL
t+s)a n dl n ( ΨRL













are nonnegative. Furthermore, Cov[ln(1+
ΨRL
t+s), ln(1+gt)] is positive when γ<1, and negative when γ>1. In general Cov(rRL
t+s,rRL
t ) will therefore
be nonzero.
This result also holds for transformations of rRL
t+s and rRL
t ,g (rRL
t+s), that lend themselves to a Taylor series
expansion. Consider a ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion of g(rRL


























(ˆ πt+s−1 − π).
g(rRL





















































∂ˆ πt+i . Since Cov(ˆ πt+j, ˆ πt+i) ≥ 0, in general Cov(g(rRL
t+j), g(rRL




























































































Since g(x)=x2 is convex, Jensen’s inequality implies that:
E[(rRL
t+s)2]E[(rRL



























































































> 0 it follows that Cov[(rRL
t+s)2,
(rRL
t )2] > 0. 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 .Proposition 7 showed that, for γ<1, ΨRL
t (ˆ πt) is an increasing and convex
function of ˆ πt. Therefore,
E[SRL
t ]=E[ΨRL





t (ˆ πt),D t
¤
>E [ΨRL
t (ˆ πt)]E[Dt] > ΨRL
t (E[ˆ πt])E[Dt]=ΨFIE[Dt]=E[SFI
t ].
The ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that when ΨRL
t (ˆ πt) is strictly increasing in ˆ πt and ˆ πt is positively
correlated with Dt,C o v
£
ΨRL
t (ˆ πt),D t
¤
> 0; the second inequality follows from an application of Jensen’s
inequality to the strictly convex function ΨRL
t (ˆ πt).






















































monotonically increasing functions of gt. 2
46Figure 1. Perceived probability distribution of the proportion of up-states as a function of 
the forecast horizon {i}  under  adaptive and rational learning.  The belief is initialized at
10
6 ˆ = t π .
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0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Rational learning Adaptive learningFigure 2. Rational learning pricing kernel  Ψ 100) , ˆ ( t
RL π as a function of  t π ˆ for γ = ½ and γ
= 1½. For comparison the full information rational expectation (FI) pricing kernels 
RI Ψ  are 
also plotted. The figures assume  %, 4    %, 6 − = + = l h g g % 6   and    0.6, = = ρ π .
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